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Abstract 
People of non-ideal-weight (overweight or severely underweight) are subjected to discrimination, in 
the workplace and elsewhere, based on attitudinal assumptions and negative inferences from their 
membership of a group, such as that they are insufficiently self-motivated to make good employees.  
But is that discrimination unlawful in the UK?  The Equality Act 2010 offers only a very tenuous route 
for protection, because the Act is based largely on a ‘medical model’ of disability.  EU law, which 
embraces a ‘social model’ of disability, drawing from the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, offers more, at least in theory.  But the mechanisms for enforcing individual EU law 
rights mean that entitlements in EU law are likely to be enforceable in practice only against state 
employers. This situation leaves a gap in the law which is remediable only by legislative reform.  
 
A Introduction 
 
Our awareness of general attitudinal biases against people of ‘non-ideal-weight’ was given added 
focus when our daughters introduced us to Meghan Trainor’s pop song ‘All About that Bass’. 
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Trainor’s clever lyrics draw attention to the unspoken but pernicious assumptions about the qualities 
of people based on the irrelevant criterion of their membership of a particular group – that of 
people who are perceived to be overweight.  Several decades of research1 confirm patterns of 
persistent discrimination against people of ‘non-ideal-weight’,2 in the workplace, and in other 
contexts. One US study, which controlled for other factors such as race and educational attainment, 
showed that overweight women earn on average $9000 a year less than women of average weight. 
For obese women, the average is a shocking $19000 a year less.3 Nor is disadvantage limited to pay. 
                                                          
1
 See, for instance, S. E. Jackson et al, ‘Perceived Weight Discrimination in England: a population-based study of 
adults aged ≥ 50 years’ (2014) International Journal of Obesity 107; X. Liu and E. Sierminska, ‘Evaluating the 
Effect of Beauty on Labor Market Outcomes: A review of the literature’ IZA Discussion Paper, October 2014 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp8526.pdf; M. Caliendo and W. Lee, ‘Fat chance! Obesity and the transition from 
unemployment to employment’ (2013) 11 Economics & Human Biology 121; R. M. Puhl et al, ‘The stigma of 
obesity: a review and update’ (2009) 17 Obesity 941; C. Baum and W. Ford, ‘The Wage Effects of Obesity: A 
Longitudinal Study’ (2004) 13 Health Economics 885; J. Cawley, ‘The Impact of Obesity of Wages’ (2004) 39 
Journal of Human Resources 451; J. Pagan and A. Davila, ‘Obesity, Occupational Attainment, and Earnings’ 
(1997) 78 Social Science Quarterly 756; D. Hamermesh and J. Biddle, ‘Beauty and the Labour Market’ (1994) 84 
American Economic Review 1174. 
2
 The phrase ‘non-ideal-weight’ captures the notion of the (unspoken) norm from which a notional ‘ideal 
weight’ deviates as an idea, rather than something objectively measurable. It includes both over- and under-
weight individuals, although the former is significantly more common. Whether body mass index (BMI) or 
some other indicator is an appropriate measure of weight is irrelevant; what matters here is the perception of 
those initiating or perpetuating discriminatory behaviour.  
3
 S. McGee, ‘For women, being 13 pounds overweight means losing $9,000 a year in salary’ The Guardian 30 
October 2014, citing Shinall, above n 1, and J. B. Shinall, Occupational Characteristics and the Obesity Wage 
Penalty (Working paper, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379575 
(last accessed 15 July 2015). 
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There is also evidence, for instance, that weight is a factor in hiring decisions.4 The statistics are 
comparable in European contexts,5 although some studies show that the relationships between 
weight and disadvantage are more complex than initial studies suggested.6 The evidence of bias and 
negative assumptions relates to people who are ‘merely’ overweight, as well as to those who are 
obese and to those who would be classified as morbidly obese.7 Only at the levels of morbid obesity 
                                                          
4
 J. M. Fletcher, ‘Beauty vs Brains: Early labor market outcomes of high school graduates’ (2009) 105 Economics 
Letters 321; J. Larkin and H. Pines, ‘No Fat Persons Need Apply: Experimental Studies of the Overweight 
Stereotype and Hiring Preference’ (1979) 6 Work and Occupations 312. 
5
 G. Brunello and B. d’Hombres, ‘Does Body Weight Affect Wages? Evidence from Europe’ (2007) 5 Economics 
and Human Biology 1; S. Morris, ‘The impact of obesity on employment’, (2007) 14 Labour Economics 413; J. 
Garcia and C. Quintana-Domeque, ‘Obesity, Employment and Wages in Europe’ in K. Bolin and J. Cawley (eds), 
Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, The Economics of Obesity (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 
2006); A. Paraponis et al, ‘Obesity, Weight Status and Employability: Empirical evidence from a French national 
survey’ (2005) 3 Economics and Human Biology 241; S. Sarlio-Lahteenkorva and E. Lahelma, ‘The association of 
Body Mass Index with social and economic disadvantage in women and men’, (1999) 28 International Journal 
of Epidemiology 445. 
6
 M. Caliendo and M. Gerhsitz, ‘Obesity and the Labor Market: A Fresh Look at the Weight Penalty’ IZA 
Discussion Paper, February 2014 http://ftp.iza.org/dp7947.pdf (last accessed 15 July 2015); B. Harper, ‘Beauty, 
Stature and the Labour Market: A British Cohort Study’ (2000) 62 Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 
771 (this study found that once ability was controlled for, the ‘beauty premium’ disappears). 
7
 The World Health Organisation defines a person as overweight if their body mass index (a person’s weight 
divided by the square of their height) exceeds 25, and obese if it exceeds 30. Severe, morbid or type ii obesity 
(the terms are used interchangeably) begins at BMI 40. WHO, Obesity: preventing and managing the global 
epidemic Report of a WHO Consultation (Geneva: WHO Technical Report Series 894); WHO, Obesity and 
Overweight: Fact Sheet Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2003). 
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do significant functional limitations to mobility, bending or lifting arise.8 And although much of the 
research concerns overweight people, there is also evidence that people who are underweight suffer 
similar disadvantage.9 
Given that people of non-ideal-weight suffer from discrimination, are they protected from that 
discrimination by the law in the UK? Being overweight, or even obese, is not in itself a prohibited 
ground of discrimination in UK law, or in the law of the European Union, which is the source of many 
non-discrimination entitlements in the UK. But discrimination on the grounds of disability has been 
expressly prohibited by statute since the Disability Discrimination Act of 1995. So the central 
question for this article is whether people of non-ideal-weight can properly be described as disabled, 
in the sense of the applicable law. If so, then our investigation offers a possible route for legal 
protection through litigation, without the need for statutory law reform. If this is not the case, then 
the law as it currently stands offers no protection. We do not concern ourselves here whether that 
position is appropriate, from rational economic, ethical, or deontological perspectives, although we 
acknowledge that even pursuing this research agenda implies a view that such protection would be 
appropriate.10  
                                                          
8
 See, eg, M. A. Stefan, M. W. Hopman and J. F. Smythe ‘Effect of activity restriction owing to heart disease on 
obesity’ (2005) 159 Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 477. 
9
 See, eg, D. S. Hamermesh, Beauty Pays: Why Attractive People are More Successful (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013), 52-54, 103-108; D. Rhode The Beauty Bias: The Injustice of Appearance in Life and Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2010). 
10
 Some countries already protect from discrimination in some contexts on the grounds of physical 
appearance, for instance France’s Labour Code Art L 112-45. For discussion, see L S. Burri and S. Prechal, 
‘Comparative approaches to gender equality and non-discrimination within Europe’, and S. Laulom, ‘French 
legal approaches to equality and discrimination for intersecting grounds in employment relations’, both in D. 
Schiek and V Chege, (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
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We investigate in turn two possible routes for demonstrating that non-ideal-weight discrimination is 
disability discrimination in the UK: under domestic law as it currently stands; and by applying EU law. 
Our overall argument is that the former, while possible, constitutes a rather unsatisfactory and 
tenuous approach. Domestic law cleaves to what is known as a ‘medical model’ of disability. The 
direction of travel of the latter, on the other hand, is away from the medical model towards what is 
known as a ‘social model’.  Crucially, the social model includes attitudinal barriers among those 
barriers the effects of which must be tackled by anti-discrimination law.  It is such attitudinal 
barriers, including assumptions about the capacities, qualities and characteristics of individuals on 
the basis of their perceived membership of a particular group, which lead to non-ideal-weight 
discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere. EU law, which embraces a ‘social model’ in its 
definition of disability discrimination, therefore offers more promise than domestic legislation to 
those who suffer non-ideal-weight discrimination in the UK.11 
Secondly our analysis offers an insight, drawing on an important example, into the practical 
interactions between international human rights law, EU law and domestic statute law. What are the 
obligations on the UK judiciary to interpret domestic statutes where EU legislation applies? Do these 
differ where the EU law itself embodies international human rights obligations, reflected in the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights? How do British courts comply with duties of deference to the UK 
Parliament, with the consequences implied by the obligations of statutory interpretation, at the 
                                                          
11
 In adopting this approach to the social model, we are referring to ‘attitudinal barriers’ arising from the views 
and perceptions of people who do not have disabilities (for instance, employers), rather than the attitudes of 
people with disabilities themselves. By contrast, O’Brien has argued that the EU’s definition of disability is 
based on ‘the language of the social model of disability, but adhering to a predominantly medical model … a 
market-medical model in which the “attitudinal barriers” are those of the disabled people themselves’, see C. 
O’Brien, Union citizenship and disability: restricted access to equality rights and the attitudinal model of 
disability’ in D Kochenov, ed, Citizenship and Federalism in Europe: The Role of Rights (CUP, 2016). See further 
below. 
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same time as duties in EU law to secure enforceability of rights found in EU Directives, and human 
rights found in the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights? We will consider whether, in the light of a 
theoretical but entirely plausible factual matrix, fundamental rights, derived from these instruments 
and treated as a general principle of EU law, have begun to be the driver for an important change in 
the hitherto broadly settled constitutional arrangements between EU and national courts.  
Furthermore, we will ask how the UK courts are to deal with the EU’s under-developed 
jurisprudence on the constitutional consequences of the need to give full effect to fundamental 
rights.  Here, we will see, textbook or traditional accounts of the relationships between EU and 
national law, and the consequences for judicial behaviour, fall short of capturing the sort of ‘judicial 
gymnastics’ involved, where first instance and appellate judges seek to comply with EU law without 
doing disproportionate damage to the language of a domestic statute. Where such litigation is at 
least potentially concerned with the protection of the human right to non-discrimination, what 
appear to be mundane claims of individuals (for instance, of employees against their private 
employers) take on a constitutional quality and significance. 
Finally, we uncover the limits of the theoretical possibilities described above. In particular, we will 
seek to describe the complex challenges which may arise as a consequence of a successful assertion 
of a particular fundamental right (to non-discrimination on grounds of disability) in the face of non-
compliant national legislation. Those challenges range from a threat to the entire structural integrity 
of the relevant national law to complex forensic and conceptual difficulties resulting from an 
inherent imprecision of the right in question. We offer tentative solutions to some but not all of the 
difficulties and in so doing pave the way for future discussion as to what, if any, is the best way for 
the UK to give full effect to the fundamental rights of persons with disabilities more generally and 
persons with non-ideal weight in particular. 
 
A The domestic law: the Equality Act (2010) (the Act) 
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B The history and origins of the Act 
The legislation which currently provides protection from discrimination in the UK is the Equality Act 
2010 (the Act). It is the instrument by which the United Kingdom gives effect to Directive 
2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment for employment in employment 
and occupation (the Framework Directive).12 It is also the instrument through which the UK complies 
with non-discrimination obligations in international law, such as under the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRD) 2006.13 The Act is a consolidating 
statute, bringing together several earlier Acts and Regulations.14 One of the Acts which it repealed in 
the process of consolidation was the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA). With the exception of 
the broadening of the term ‘day-to-day activities’, the new Act made no change to the definition of 
disability in the DDA. 
The history of the disability discrimination provisions in the Equality Act thus lies in that of the 
DDA.15 In the early and mid-1990s, when the UK was considering the introduction of a prohibition 
against discrimination in the workplace on the ground of disability, there were, essentially, two 
                                                          
12
 OJ 2000 L 303/16. 
13
 UNCRD (adopted 13 December 2006, entry into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3.  The UNCRD is not itself 
directly enforceable in UK law, see R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v Secretary 
of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, although note the dissenting opinions of Hale and Kerr (in the 
minority).  
14
 For example the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 , the Race Relations Act 1976, the Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003 and the Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. 
15
 For further discussion of the history of the DDA, see B. Doyle, ‘Enabling Legislation or Dissembling Law? The 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995’ (1997) 60 Modern Law Review 64. 
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options open to the legislature. These are still most commonly referred to as a ‘medical model’16 and 
a ‘social model’. The former holds that the effect of an ‘impairment’ upon function is what creates 
the disability. So a person who has impaired mobility is disabled because their ability to walk is 
limited. The latter, which has been expressed in a variety of ways, some more radical than others, 
instead points to the interaction between impairment and barriers erected by society which create 
the disability. A person with a mobility impairment is disabled by some aspect of society (say, the 
built environment) which makes it difficult or impossible to mobilise without the ability to walk. 
Further, people with impairments face stigmatisation and barriers to their full participation in 
society as a result of their minority group status or stereotypical assumptions, in the same way as 
people from BME communities or women.17 Here, we use the term ‘social model’ to refer to any 
model which seeks to define disability as arising out of the barriers erected by a society which, in 
interaction with their physical or mental impairments, limit disabled persons’ full participation in 
that society. 
The World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Impairments Disabilities and 
Handicaps (ICIDH) 1980 defined disability adopting a medical model thus  
                                                          
16
 For reasons which will become apparent, we also refer to this as a ‘functional deficit’ model. 
17
 An early use of the term ‘social model’ is found in P. Hunt, Stigma: The Experience of Disability, (London, 
Geoffrey Chapman, 1966). For further discussion, see M. Oliver, Understanding Disability: From Theory to 
Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 1996 and 2009); I. Solanke, ‘Stigma: A limiting principle allowing 
multiple-consciousness in anti-discrimination law’ in Schiek and Chege, above n 10; J. L. Roberts, ‘Healthism 
and the Law of Employment Discrimination’ (2014) 99 Iowa Law Review 571, 584-587; L. Waddington, ‘ “Not 
disabled enough”: How European Courts filter non-discrimination claims through a narrow view of disability’ 
(2015) European Journal of Human Rights 11.  
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‘In the context of health experience, a disability is any restriction or lack (resulting from an 
impairment) of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered 
normal for a human being’.18 
Whereas, in contrast, the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS), building on 
Hunt’s work,19 asserted in 1976, relying on a social model, that disability is: 
‘the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a contemporary social organisation 
which takes little or no account of people who have physical impairments and thus excludes 
them from participation in the mainstream of social activities’.20 
Several jurisdictions adopted definitions of disability based on the concept of ‘impairment’.  Those 
adopting a ‘medical model’ require that the ‘impairment’ adversely affects the ability to carry out 
day-to-day activities.21  In contrast, some definitions22 pay little or no regard to what effect the 
                                                          
18
 Section 3, Classification of Disabilities, p 143. 
19
 above n 17. 
20
 Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation, Fundamental Principles of Disability, (London: UPIAS, 
1976). 
21
 The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) defines a person with a disability as a person who has, or has 
had, a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, and certain 
people ‘perceived’ to meet the definition. Title 42 Chapter 126 s 12102.  Hamermesh suggest that ‘ugly’ people 
could be protected under the ADA, see supra n 9, 151. Successful litigation under the ADA, however, involves 
more than merely being overweight, there must be a restriction of a ‘major life activity’ (ie the medical model). 
Contrast, for instance, Coleman v Georgia Power Co 81 F Supp 2d 1365 (N.D.Ga 2000) with Cook v Rhode Island 
Dept of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals 10 F.3d 17 (1
st
 Cir 1993). See J. L. Roberts, ‘Healthism and 
the Law of Employment Discrimination’ (2014) 99 Iowa Law Review 571. Germany (Act on the Equalisation of 
Disabled People 2002, Art 3), Austria (Bundes- Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz 2005, Art 3), and Switzerland 
(Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz 2002 Art 2(1)) have also adopted the medical model, see T. Degener, ‘The 
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impairment would have to have in order to be disabling. In consequence, the courts and executives 
of those countries have felt free to approach the definition as allowing scope for a social model, 
where the impairment’s interaction with the social environment creates the disadvantage.23  
These competing models each found expression in legislation seeking to protect people with 
disability from discrimination. The drafters of the DDA chose a model of disability which is primarily 
medical.24 Satisfaction of the definition in the DDA requires the existence of an impairment, mental 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Definition of Disability in German and Foreign Discrimination Law’ (2006) 26 Disability Studies Quarterly 11. 
The South African Employment Equity Act No 55, 1998, s 1 defines people with disabilities as ‘people who have 
a long-term or recurring physical or mental impairment, which substantially limits their prospects of entry into 
or advancement in employment’, see further J. M. Hoskins, Incapacity, disability and dismissal : the 
implications for South African labour jurisprudence (University of Western Cape 
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/xmlui/handle/11394/1729). 
22
 For instance, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, section 15 (1); the Australian Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 s 4; the New Zealand Human Rights Act No 82, 1993, s 21; and the Irish Employment 
Equality Act 1998 s 2(1). See G. Quinn, M. McDonagh and C. Kimber, (eds), Disability Discrimination Law in the 
US, Australia and Canada (Dublin: Oak Tree Press 1993). 
23
 See for example, the Canadian Supreme Court in Eldridge v British Columbia (AG) [1997] 3 SCR 624; Quebec v 
Montréal; Quebec v Boisbriand [2000] 1 SCR 665; and the Australian High Court in Purvis v New South Wales 
(2003) 202 ALR 133. See also the definition of disability in the New Zealand Disability Strategy of 2009. Some 
have claimed that the Netherlands Wet gelijke behandeling op grond van handicap of chronische zeikte 2003 
(Act on Equal Treatment on the grounds of disability or chronic illness) adopts a social model, see C. Heißl and 
G. Boot, ‘The application of the EU Framework for Disability Discrimination in 18 European countries’ (2013) 4 
European Labour Law Journal 119. For a US perspective on the competing models, see M. A. Stein, ‘Disability 
Human Rights’ (2007) 95(1) California Law Review 75. Note that many US states and localities have adopted 
provisions on weight discrimination, see Hamermesh above n 9, 152-153. 
24
 Although the s 6 definition is classically medical, it is modified by Sched 1, in particular the severe 
disfigurement provision in Art 3 and the deeming provisions in Arts 6 (cancer, HIV and Multiple Sclerosis) and 8 
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or physical, which has a substantial, long term, adverse effect on the ability to carry out day-to-day 
activities. The similarity to the 1980 ICIHT and the ADA definitions will be immediately apparent.  
The DDA focuses on a functional deficit caused by impairment.  It does not consider the social 
context. During the passage of the Bill, the Minister of State responsible, William Hague, explained 
that the definition had been settled on as one which was easily understood. He described it as 
covering people who are disabled ‘in commonsense terms’ and referred to the need to ensure that 
the Bill’s aim be met by ‘carrying with us’ employers, business and the general public.25 Nonetheless, 
the definition was the subject of contemporary criticism26 on the ground that it did not conform with 
the UN Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, adopted in 
1993, which encompass a social model definition of disability. 27 
B Characteristics protected under the Act 
Under the Equality Act, all three elements - impairment, long term and substantial adverse effect - 
must be proved before the right to complain of discriminatory treatment is established. To fall short 
of proving any of the components of that definition is to fall outside the protection of the Act. An 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(progressive conditions). To the extent that each of these allow for conditions to be treated as disabling even 
though they may not (yet) have any substantial adverse effect they introduce a social model element to the 
definition.  For further discussion of the DDA’s approach, in context, see B. Hepple Equality: The Legal 
Framework (Oxford: Hart, 2014); S Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 2011) 95-101; B. Doyle, 
Disability Discrimination Law and Practice (Bristol: Jordans, 2008) 15-36; N. Bamforth, M. Malik, C. O’Cinneide 
Discrimination Law: Theory and Context (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2008); A. McColgan, Discrimination Law: 
Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 566-589. 
25
 HC Deb Standing Committee E vol 566 col 73 28 March 1995. 
26
 B. Doyle, ‘Disabled Workers’ Rights, the Disability Discrimination Act and the UN Standard Rules’ (1996) 25 
Industrial Law Journal 1, 11. 
27
 UN Standard Rules on the Equalisation of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, paras 17 and 18. 
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extreme, but theoretically possible example, would be a person with a physical impairment which 
had had a substantial adverse effect on their ability to carry out day-to-day activities for 11 months 
and 29 days. Since ‘long term’ is defined in the Act as a year, that person could not complain of 
discrimination arising from a disability contrary to section 15 of the Act if they were dismissed 
because of their absence from work which itself was wholly caused by the impairment.  Our 
question is to what extent people with non-ideal weight can rely upon the disability discrimination 
provisions in the Equality Act to seek protection from discrimination. Excess weight or emaciation is 
not of itself a disability but may give rise to impairments which, if they have the necessary effects of 
sufficient duration, might result in definition of disability in the Act being satisfied. We examine each 
of the elements of the definition of disability in turn. 
C ‘Impairment’ 
Section 6(1) of the Act provides that a person has a disability if they have a physical or mental 
impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on that person’s ability to carry out 
day-to-day activities. Any tendency to equate ‘impairment’ with ‘illness’ was dealt with firmly by the 
Court of Session, Inner House in Miller v Inland Revenue Commissioners (a case brought under the 
DDA but of continuing authority).28 The leading opinion of Lord Penrose, at paragraph 2229 makes it 
clear that ‘physical impairment can be established without reference to causation and in particular, 
without any reference to any form of illness’. Thus to fall within the protection of the Act, it is not 
necessary that non-ideal weight constitute an ‘illness’. 
In J v DLA Piper,30 the Employment Appeal Tribunal made the point that there may be difficult 
medical questions in deciding the nature of an impairment. Where there might be a dispute as to the 
                                                          
28
 [2006] IRLR 112. 
29
 p 116. 
30
 [2010] IRLR 936. 
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existence of an impairment, it would be sensible to identify whether the claimant’s ability to carry 
out day-to-day activities was adversely affected and to draw ‘commonsense’ inferences about the 
existence of impairment from the results of that enquiry. With this background, there is no obvious 
reason why the mere fact of a particular body mass might not give rise to impairment. The courts’ 
pragmatic approach, which dispenses with the complications of causation and even precise 
identification, focuses on the question of function. Does some aspect of the claimant’s condition, 
physical or mental, impair their functioning? In relation to obesity, the point was made clearly by 
Langstaff P, in the unreported decision of the EAT in Walker v SITA Information Networking 
Computing Ltd: 
‘Third, though I do not accept that obesity renders a person disabled of itself, it may make it 
more likely that someone is disabled.  Therefore on an evidential basis it may permit a 
Tribunal more readily to conclude that the individual before them does indeed suffer from 
an impairment or, for that matter, a condition such as diabetes, if that diabetes is such as to 
have a substantial effect upon normal day-to-day activities.’ 31 
If non-ideal weight can be shown to have a substantial effect on normal day-to-day activities, or if a 
Tribunal may infer that from its understanding of non-ideal weight, it may constitute an impairment 
under the Act. 
C ‘Substantial adverse effect’ 
The Act requires that an impairment must have a substantial adverse effect on a person’s ability to 
carry out day-to-day activities.32 The phrase ‘day-to-day activities’ is not defined. The DDA did define 
                                                          
31
 UKEAT/0097/12, para 18. For an extended discussion of the Walker ruling, reaching a different overall 
conclusion to ours, see S. W. Flint and J. Snook, ‘Obesity and discrimination: The next “big issue”’ (2014) 14 
International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 183. 
32
 s 6(1)(b). 
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the phrase and limited it to a consideration of a closed list of ‘activities’ which included, for example 
mobility, physical dexterity and the ability to lift and carry ‘everyday’ objects.33 It cannot be the case 
that the Equality Act intends that activities are confined to those necessitated by the person’s 
employment, because the definition must hold good in non-employment cases also.34  
The approach of the UK courts to the issue has been to focus the enquiry on things that a person 
cannot do or can only do with difficulty.35 It is a ‘functional deficit test’. This approach is supported 
by the Guidance issued by the Secretary of State under the Act.36 The Guidance37 gives, as an 
example of an impairment likely to meet the necessary conditions: ‘a woman is obese. Her obesity in 
itself is not an impairment, but it causes breathing and mobility difficulties which substantially 
adversely affect her ability to walk’.38 Since the Act no longer limits the definition of day-to-day 
activities, there is an even wider scope than under the DDA for considering the potential functional 
consequences of excessive weight or indeed its opposite. For example, severely underweight people 
are more prone to exhaustion and do not deal well with cold. The consequences of their weight on 
their ability to carry out the day-to-day activities of remaining awake for sustained periods of time, 
and of maintaining a body temperature that allows normal functioning in a cold place may mean 
that their non-ideal-weight constitutes a disability under the Act. Again the focus is on functional 
deficit. 
                                                          
33
 DDA Sched 1, Art 4. 
34
 Contained in Parts 2 (goods and services), 4 (premises) 6 (education) and 7 (associations). 
35
 Goodwin v The Patent Office [1999] IRLR 2 (EAT), Aderemi v London & South Eastern Railway Ltd [2013] ICR 
591. 
36
 The Act (as did the DDA) empowers the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the definition of disability, (s 
6(5)). 
37
 Guidance On Matters To Be Taken In To Account In Determining Questions Relating to The Definition Of 
Disability 2011 (Official for Disability Issues, HM Government, 2011). 
38
 Para A.7. 
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C ‘Long term’ 
The adverse effect must be long term, which means that it has either already lasted for 12 months, is 
likely to last for a total of 12 months, or is likely to last for the rest of the person’s life.39 The focus is 
not on how long the impairment has existed but for how long it has, or is likely to have, the relevant 
adverse effect. Langstaff P’s judgment in Walker points out: 
‘It may also be relevant evidentially to ask whether the obesity might affect the length of 
time for which any impairment was to be suffered.  Thus in the case of someone determined 
to lose weight, in respect of whom it could confidently be predicted that they would reduce 
their weight to normal levels well within a year, with the consequent result that they no 
longer suffered from impairments which could confidently be ascribed to the weight itself, 
this could have the result that there was no disability, for those impairments would not last 
for over 12 months.’40  
There is nothing about non-ideal-weight which causes any particular conceptual difficulties when 
considering the definition of disability from the point of view of functional deficit.  But, as the 
discussion in this section has shown, there may of course be evidential difficulties in proving the 
various elements of the definition. For example, an obese person who is imminently to undergo 
bariatric surgery may have difficulty in satisfying the requirement for long term effect. A person with 
a high BMI but not yet morbidly obese may have some limitation, say to their walking, but it might 
be insufficient to be regarded as substantial.41  
                                                          
39
 Sched 1, Art 2. 
40
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But the real problem, noted in the introduction, is that the evidence shows that people with non-
ideal-weight suffer discriminatory treatment even though their weight does not result in any 
impairment or at least any impairment having the requisite long-term substantial adverse effect. The 
definition of disability in the Act, focused as it is on the ‘functional deficit’, inspired by a medical 
model of impairment, suggests that such adverse treatment does not fall under the scope of the Act. 
C. Severe disfigurement 
In a few significant instances,42 the definition of disability in the Act departs from a purely medical 
model. Schedule 1, Article 3 provides that ‘an impairment which consists of a severe disfigurement is 
to be treated as having a substantial adverse effect on the ability of the person concerned to carry 
out normal day-to-day activities’.43 The Act deems an impairment (severe disfigurement) which does 
not in fact have a substantial adverse effect (a ‘functional deficit’) as nevertheless having that effect 
for the purposes of determining whether there is a disability in the sense of the Act. The Court of 
Appeal in Northern Ireland, in Cosgrove v Northern Ireland Ambulance Service,44 observed 
‘The reason that disfigurement is given access to the protected category by the device of the 
deeming provision is that those who are at risk of being refused employment or 
disadvantaged in relation to employment arrangements because of their appearance form a 
group that require equivalent protection to those who cannot carry out normal day-to-day 
activities. It appears to us that this special status reflects the increased consideration that it 
is felt should be accorded this group on account of their disfigurement.’45 
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A further guide to the nature of this exception can be gleaned from the Guidance. Paragraph B25 
states that assessing severity will be a matter of degree of disfigurement, but that it may be 
necessary to take into account nature, size and prominence.  
The very nature of this exception to the general rule points to a social model of disability. That 
model of disability holds that the disability arises from some aspect of society, for example the way 
the built environment is arranged or the way in which social attitudes are constructed, in this case 
the latter. The suggestion that ‘prominence’ might be a factor in determining severity reinforces the 
idea that this is a social model approach to disability. In cases of a physical impairment with a 
substantial adverse effect, the question of prominence, that is, to what extent is the disability 
visible, goes directly to the question of the cause of the adverse treatment.  In the case of severe 
disfigurement, prominence or visibility of the impairment is a factor in determining whether the 
gateway test of ‘functional deficit’ is met. The relevance of prominence or size can only go to the 
question of the reaction it provokes. The Act recognises that, because of construction of social 
attitudes, people are more likely to discriminate against people whose disfigurement is prominent 
and visible, and therefore a prominent, sizeable and visible disfigurement is more likely to meet the 
test of severity. By way of illustration, the unreported decision of HHJ Eady QC in the EAT in 
Hutchinson 3G UK Ltd v Edwards46 deals with a claimant with Poland Syndrome. The Employment 
Tribunal at paragraph 6.2 of its judgment had found that: ‘The claimant has a substantial 
disfigurement to his chest. He is missing the major chest muscle and the sternal head on the left side 
of his chest. He is also missing two ribs. That amounts to a substantial disfigurement to his chest. It is 
clearly prominent as the claimant goes to substantial length to hide it.’47  In dealing with the 
question of severity, HHJ Eady observed that the Tribunal was entitled to consider the psychological 
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effect of the disfigurement upon the claimant, in that case said to be significant. Such an effect was 
not a necessary requirement to establish severity, but it was certainly a relevant consideration.48 
As to severity therefore, people with non-ideal-weight may well be able to meet the definition. The 
prominence and ready visibility of their weight, provoking as it might the sort of stereotypical 
responses we have already discussed, or the effect on their psyche of non-ideal-weight – low self-
esteem, social anxiety – would be factors which could be relied upon to prove disability. But the real 
difficulty with meeting the definition of disability via the deeming provision of severe disfigurement 
lies in the idea of ‘disfigurement’. 
The Act does not define the term ‘disfigurement’ and the authorities49 proceed on the basis that the 
word needs no definition. It follows that the normal canons of statutory interpretation apply. In the 
absence of a definition, the legislator must be taken to intend that the ordinary English meaning of 
the word in common usage applies.50 In ascertaining the ordinary meaning of a word, it is 
permissible to turn to the dictionary.51 The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb ‘disfigure’ as 
‘to mar the figure or appearance of; to deform, to deface’ and the noun ‘disfigurement’ as 
‘something that disfigures; a deformity, defacement’. The connotation of the word therefore is of 
something considerably stronger than a ‘departure from the norm’. It means something a great deal 
more than a factor which renders the person merely unattractive, although aesthetics are certainly 
engaged. Some clue as to the meaning of the word ‘disfigurement’ may be gleaned from 
subordinate legislation, made under a power in Schedule 1, Article 3 (a) and (b) of the Act,52 which 
provides that a severe disfigurement consisting of a tattoo or a piercing is not to be treated as having 
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a substantial adverse effect. Furthermore, the Guidance gives, as examples of disfigurement, scars, 
birthmarks, limb or postural deformation (including restricted bodily development) and diseases of 
the skin. These examples reinforce the idea that a disfigurement is that which mars or deforms. Nor 
is there anything inherently absurd or contradictory about such an interpretation, which might 
require a court or tribunal to depart from the literal approach to statutory interpretation. 
Although not a natural reading of the word ‘disfigurement’, being of non-ideal-weight might be 
capable of being described as being marred or deformed, within the literal approach. However, 
Court of Appeal authority suggests that a purposive approach to interpretation of ‘disfigurement’ is 
appropriate. Cosgrove53 describes the purpose of the provision. It can either been seen as an 
exception to the general requirement to show functional effect (and that is the rationale given in 
Cosgrove) or, in the alternative, can be viewed as asserting the existence of a particular type of 
functional deficit. In either case, it is designed to ensure that people with severe disfigurements are 
brought within the scope of the definition because of the disadvantage to which they are put 
because of their appearance.  The reason for the disadvantage must be the disfigurement itself. 
What then is the reason for the disadvantage which people of non-ideal-weight experience? It may, 
in part, arise from a feeling that such people are unattractive, but the literature suggests that that 
appearance gives rise to stereotypical assumptions about the value or worth of those individuals.54 It 
is not their appearance per se, provoking revulsion or fear, but because their weight triggers 
conscious or unconscious bias centred on their personality, which gives rise to discriminatory 
treatment. Whilst the well-evidenced existence of weight based discrimination may be a ground for 
offering protection under the legislation, it is not a reason to suppose that the purpose of the 
drafters of the Act was to include non-ideal-weight within the definition of disfigurement. 
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The extremes of weight occupied by morbid obesity or severe emaciation might be said to lead to 
disfigurement, although that is not natural language even then. In any event, those individuals 
would meet the functional impairment test, and so an argument based on disfigurement would be 
unnecessary. Mere departure from ideal weight is unlikely to meet anybody’s idea of a 
disfigurement adopting the normal UK approach to statutory interpretation. 
 
B Conduct prohibited under the Act 
The Act explicitly outlaws certain ‘prohibited conduct’.55 As applied to the protected characteristic of 
disability, prohibited conduct is as follows: direct discrimination,56 harassment,57 indirect 
discrimination,58 adverse treatment for a reason arising from disability,59 and, crucially, breach of the 
duty to make reasonable adjustments.60 Of these, only the wording in the sections on direct 
discrimination and harassment leaves scope for claims to be brought by someone who does not 
actually possess the protected characteristic, in this context, someone who does not have a 
disability.61  Where the person’s weight falls short of creating a disability that constitutes an 
impairment within the functional test of the medical model, the disadvantage suffered by those 
subject to non-ideal-weight discrimination might be based on a perception that they meet the 
statutory definition of disability. Therefore, we focus here on direct discrimination and harassment, 
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and do not consider other types of conduct which are not prohibited in perception-based claims. In 
so doing, we recognise that, whilst the concept of perceived disability might extend protection 
against discrimination to some people with non-ideal-weight who do not meet the functional deficit 
test, the limitations of this approach are significant.  
 
C Direct discrimination 
Here the conduct is treating a person less favourably because of a protected characteristic (our 
emphasis) than the way in which another person would be treated. The words in italics represent a 
significant departure from the predecessor legislation which limited direct discrimination to 
treatment ‘of a disabled person’. In order to attract the protection of the DDA from direct 
discrimination, a claimant him or herself had to be disabled. But such a limitation did not conform 
with the EU’s Framework Directive 2000/78,62 in the light of the wording of Article 2 (2) of the 
Directive which does not require that the person bringing the complaint themselves possess the 
protected characteristic. In Coleman,63 the CJEU confirmed that Mrs Coleman could pursue a 
complaint of direct discrimination because of her association with someone (her child) who was 
disabled. The new definition also opens the way to an argument that a person who is merely 
perceived as having a disability is protected from direct discrimination. We discuss that possibility in 
more detail below. 
 
C Harassment 
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The Act also outlaws harassment. Section 26 defines what treatment amounts to harassment and 
provides that a person harasses another person if she or he subjects that person to unwanted 
conduct, related to a protected characteristic, which meets the definition. Here too there is no 
requirement that the complainant actually possess the required characteristic and that was 
confirmed by Coleman64 in the context of harassment by association. On the face of it, the same 
reasoning ought to apply to perception-based claims. Harassing treatment because the putative 
harasser perceives a person to have a disability is, ipso facto, treatment related to disability.65  
 
C Discrimination based on a perception of disability 
The implication of the above is that the Act provides protection from direct discrimination and 
harassment based on a perception of disability. This is not made explicit in the wording of the Act,66 
but may be supported by the following argument. The Equality and Human Rights Commission Code 
of Practice on Employment (2011) provides an explanation of the Act, and whilst not an 
authoritative statement of the law, must be referred to by courts and tribunals where relevant.67 At 
paragraphs 3.21 and 7.10, the Code explicitly recognises the possibility of the prohibited conduct 
being on the basis of a perception that the protected characteristic is present. Thus a wrongly held 
perception that a person is a person with a disability could found a complaint of harassment or 
direct discrimination. So, for example, an employer who (wrongly) believed that an overweight 
employee was disabled, and treated that person less favourably because of that perception, would 
be directly discriminating because of the protected characteristic of disability. 
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What must the alleged discriminator be shown to actually perceive in order for a person who has 
been adversely treated because of that perception to claim that there has been a perception of 
disability? It must be doubtful that many claimants will be able to show the existence of the 
perception without, in fact, satisfying the functional deficit requirement. A recent first instance 
decision in the Employment Tribunal, Estlin v Central Manchester University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust,68 concluded that, in a case of perceived disability discrimination, the employer 
would have to have had in mind all of the factors entailed in the definition of disability. This 
approach is consistent with the jurisprudence on the question of knowledge of disability. It is well 
established that, in order to succeed in a claim for, say, direct discrimination because of disability, a 
claimant must show that the alleged discriminator knew of the existence of the disability.69 
‘Knowledge’ here means knowledge of all the factors which comprise the definition of disability as 
they apply to the claimant.70 In other words, the employer must have considered the questions of 
impairment and long term adverse effect. It seems improbable that a level of consideration less 
detailed than that would suffice to fix an alleged discriminator with a perception of the existence of 
the disability. If it is indeed this level of consideration that must be shown, it is unlikely that a 
claimant could successfully show that an alleged discriminator had developed the perception that a 
claimant met the definition without a certain amount of evidence that that was in fact the case, 
even if that evidence was observation or impression. We would suggest that there will be relatively 
few claimants who could show ‘perception’ without also being able to show that they actually meet 
the functional deficit test.  
 
B Conclusion 
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There are three possible ways in which people with non-ideal-weight may meet the definition of 
disability in the Act and thus attract protection from discrimination. They may be deemed to be 
disabled if their weight is such as to result in ‘severe disfigurement’. We consider that to be unlikely 
for all but perhaps the most extreme ends of the weight spectrum. They may be perceived to be 
disabled although establishing the existence of such a perception would be the ground only for 
claims of direct discrimination or harassment. Finally they may meet the basic ‘medical model’ 
definition in section 6, that is, if their weight is such that it creates substantial functional deficit. 
There will be people whose weight is such that their ability, say, to mobilise is so compromised that 
they meet the section 6 definition.71 However, the types of non-ideal-weight discrimination of most 
interest here are not those where an impairment with actual long term effect is present. As we have 
already pointed out, most non-ideal-weight discrimination arises from stereotypical assumptions 
which attach to people whose bodies do not fit an ideal, although in most cases their weight will not 
give rise to any significant functional deficit. Although we have described possible routes to 
protection available in the Act, we consider them to be problematic and fragile as long as domestic 
law retains its adherence to the medical model of disability.   
 
A European Union law: Directive 2000/78/EC (The Framework Directive) 
If protection for people of non-ideal-weight from discrimination is only a tenuous possibility under 
UK law, might EU law offer some hope?  Disability discrimination is prohibited under Directive 
2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 
(The Framework Directive).72 The Directive is expressly designed, inter alia, to ‘foster a labour market 
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favourable to social integration’ by ‘combating discrimination against groups such as persons with 
disability’.73 The Directive applies only to equal treatment in employment and occupation.74  
B ‘Disability’ under the Directive 
The Directive does not define the term ‘disability’. Earlier provisions of EU anti-discrimination law75 
did not cover disability. The Directive refers to the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental 
Rights of Workers,76 but, although the Charter recognises the need to take action for the social and 
economic integration of disabled people, it does not define disability. Nor does the Council’s 
Recommendation 86/379/EEC on the employment of disabled people in the Community.77 The 
Recommendation merely says that the term includes people with ‘serious disabilities which result 
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from physical, mental or psychological impairments’. The text of the Directive thus leaves open the 
question of whether EU law understands disability through a medical or a social model.78  
C The Chacón Navas approach 
It was not until the 2006 decision of the CJEU in Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA79 that the 
matter was addressed authoritatively. The CJEU observed that there was no definition of disability in 
the Directive and that the Directive made no reference to the law of the Member States for the 
purpose of determining its meaning. The term was, therefore, to be given an autonomous and 
uniform interpretation, having regard to the objective pursued by the legislation. That objective was 
to combat certain types of discrimination, including disability, as regards occupation and 
employment.  ‘In that context, the concept of “disability” must be understood as referring to a 
limitation which results in particular from physical mental or psychological impairments which 
hinders the participation of a person in professional life.’80 
It is not at all clear why this particular, narrow approach followed so obviously from the purpose of 
the Directive. The Advocate General’s Opinion refers to the ‘rapid evolution’ of the concept of 
disability. He expressly mentions that disability has both a medico-scientific and a social sense.81 
However, he goes on to say ‘Nonetheless, in developing a uniform interpretation of the term 
‘disability’, account should be taken of the aforementioned dynamic aspect of society’s perception 
of the phenomenon of disability as a functional limitation resulting from a mental or physical defect, 
the evolution of medical and biomedical understanding and the major contextual differences in the 
assessment of a wide variety of disabilities.’ 
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Certainly the UK courts understood the decision in Chacón Navas to create no particular difficulties 
with the functional deficit approach to the definition of disability in the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995, the relevant provision then in force.82 Nor is it difficult to see why. An espousal of a social 
model of disability would have entailed a reference in the CJEU’s ruling to systemic barriers and 
negative attitudes which result in impairments becoming disabling. Instead, the idea of ’professional 
life’ remains uninterrogated, and the focus is upon functional limitations to the ability to participate 
fully in it.83  Nonetheless, the medical model is not inconsistent with the text of the Directive, or the 
obligations of the CJEU to interpret the Directive at the time of the Chacón Navas ruling. 
C The post-2010 position 
These obligations changed in December 2010, when the European Council approved the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 (UNCRD).84  From the date of its 
approval, the UNCRD became an ‘integral part of the European Union legal order’.85  EU legislation 
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(including the Directive) must be interpreted, as far as possible, consistently with the UNCRD.86 
Article 1 of the UNCRD defines disability thus: 
‘Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or 
sensory impairments which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.’ 
Paragraph e) of the preamble reads as follows 
‘recognising that disability is an evolving concept and that disability results from the 
interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers 
that hinders their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.’ 
It will be immediately apparent that the UNCRD adopts a strong variant of the social model of 
disability.87 
That the UNCRD adopts the social model was acknowledged by the CJEU in 2013 in Ring.88  Advocate 
General Kokott expressly recognised that, since the UNCRD defines disability as arising from the 
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‘interaction with various barriers’, the approach to the definition of disability in Chacón Navas might 
fall short of the protection extended by the UNCRD in certain circumstances.89 The CJEU’s judgment 
on the question of the definition of disability adopts the A-G’s Opinion. Paragraph 38 reads: ‘the 
concept of “disability” must be understood as referring to a limitation which results in particular 
from physical, mental or psychological impairments which in interaction with various barriers (our 
emphasis) may hinder the full and effective participation of the person concerned in professional life 
on an equal basis with other workers.’ A social model approach to defining disability under the 
Directive in Ring was followed in 2014 by Z v A Government Department,90 and Glatzel v Freistaat 
Bayern.91  
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C Kaltoft 
At that point it might be thought that the social model had taken a full hold of the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU, save that, although the phrase ‘various barriers’ had been used repeatedly, what those 
barriers might amount to was yet to be clarified. The CJEU was given an opportunity to deal with the 
matter further in the reference from the District Court of Kolding, Denmark, in the case of Kaltoft.92  
As this is the most recent CJEU ruling on the subject, it deserves some elaboration. 
Kaltoft was employed by the Municipality of Billund as a childminder. He was obese in the clinical 
sense, having a BMI of over 40. In 2013, he was dismissed and complained that the decision to 
dismiss him was on the ground of his obesity. The Danish Court referred four questions to the CJEU, 
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two of which were answered. The first was whether EU law laid down a general principle of non-
discrimination on the ground of obesity as such. This was answered in the negative.   
The second question was whether EU law is to be understood as meaning that the obesity of a 
worker constitutes disability.  From Ring, disability refers to a limitation resulting from impairments 
which, in interaction with various barriers, may hinder the full and effective participation of the 
person concerned in professional life on an equal basis with others. Kaltoft argued that the barriers 
he faced were both physical (for example, reduced mobility) and prejudice because of his physical 
appearance93. 
Advocate General Jääskinen acknowledged that barriers in such a case might include attitudinal and 
environmental barriers as referred to in the preamble to the UNCRD, and in the judgment of the 
CJEU in Ring.94  The Advocate General continued with the Opinion that, ‘in cases where the condition 
of obesity has reached a degree that it, in interaction with attitudinal and environmental barriers, as 
mentioned in the UNCRD,95 plainly hinders full participation in professional life on an equal footing 
with other employees due to the physical and/or psychological limitations that it entails, then it can 
be considered to be a disability.’96 
Surprisingly however, and for no discernible reason outlined in the Opinion up to that point, the 
Advocate General then opined that the definition ought only to be satisfied by persons with ‘severe’ 
obesity (defined as Body Mass Index of 40 or more).97   
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In dealing with the second question, the CJEU referred to its earlier rulings.98  The CJEU repeated the 
formulation of the concept of disability in Ring99 and continued: 
‘58 It should be noted that obesity does not in itself constitute a ‘disability’ within the 
meaning of Directive 2000/78, on the ground that, by its nature, it does not necessarily 
entail the existence of a limitation as referred to in paragraph 53 of this judgment. 
59 However, in the event that, under given circumstances, the obesity of the worker 
concerned entails a limitation which results in particular from physical, mental or 
psychological impairments that in interaction with various barriers may hinder the full and 
effective participation of that person in professional life on an equal basis with other 
workers, and the limitation is a long-term one, obesity can be covered by the concept of 
‘disability’ within the meaning of Directive 2000/78 … 100 
60 Such would be the case, in particular, if the obesity of the worker hindered his full and 
effective participation in professional life on an equal basis with other workers on account of 
reduced mobility or the onset, in that person, of medical conditions preventing him from 
carrying out his work or causing discomfort when carrying out his professional activity (our 
emphasis).’ 
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On the face of it, the judgment appears to be looking in two directions at the same time. Having paid 
the appropriate homage to the primacy of the social model in paragraph 59, the judgment appears 
to home in on a purely medical model in paragraph 60.  
It would, however, be a mistake to take paragraph 60 as limiting obese workers to having to show 
functional impairments, say to mobility, in order to prove their disability. The words ‘in particular’ 
ought to be read as addressing the particular facts of the instant case. If the Danish court were to 
find that Mr Kaltoft had ‘reduced mobility’ or ‘discomfort when carrying out his professional 
activity’, it need look no further. Given that Kaltoft was severely obese, such a finding would be 
unsurprising. Paragraph 60 would not look out of place in the EAT’s ‘medical model’ judgment in 
Walker.101  But it need not be taken as the CJEU reverting to a purely medical model, and it certainly 
need not be taken as shutting the door on the idea that an impairment can result in disability 
through its interaction with attitudinal or environmental barriers. Kaltoft is the fourth in the series of 
disability cases decided after the EU’s approval of the UNCRD. All of the rulings on the point since 
the approval of the UNCRD have taken care to repeat the social model formulation. Kaltoft, as we 
have seen, does that too. To treat paragraph 60 of Kaltoft as an abandonment of that general line of 
jurisprudence would be to place unwarranted weight on a part of a judgment that is probably only 
intended as a steer to the national court. It is in any case unlikely that the CJEU would reverse a clear 
direction of travel without explicitly signalling its intention so to do102 and in Kaltoft, on the contrary, 
the CJEU expressly referred back to Ring when setting out the definition of disability.103 Whilst there 
may be some frustration that the CJEU chose not to highlight the significance of the attitudinal 
barriers that Mr Kaltoft in part relied upon, that should not be taken as evidence that in some future 
reference, where they are of more central significance to the fact patterns of the claim, they will not 
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be acknowledged by the CJEU as just the sort of barrier that might turn an impairment into a 
disability.104  
B Conclusion 
Our view is that the social model – or at least a variant of the social model – has become central to 
the CJEU’s jurisprudence on the definition of disability and is likely to remain so, the continued 
flirtation with the medical model apparent in paragraph 60 of Kaltoft notwithstanding. EU law thus 
provides a possible route for protection of people with non-ideal-weight from discrimination arising 
from attitudinal barriers based on perceptions of the inherent qualities of members of that group, at 
least as to their capacities in the context of the world of work. This conclusion ought to have 
consequences for national courts’ interpretation of the Directive, and of their national implementing 
legislation. The following section explores those consequences. 
 
A Obligations of UK courts in EU law 
The Equality Act is the UK’s legislation implementing the Framework Directive. Since the import of 
the cases since Chacón Navas is that we must understand the Framework Directive’s prohibition of 
discrimination on the grounds of disability in the light of the UNCRD definition of disability, what 
consequence does that now have for UK law? The definition of ‘disability’ in section 6 of the Act, as it 
currently stands, is incompatible with the UNCRD’s definition to the extent described by A-G Kokott 
in her Opinion in Ring.  
There are a variety of responses to that incompatibility of UK law with EU law open to the UK. 
Legislative reform would be the most obvious. That was how Parliament responded to the CJEU’s 
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decision in Coleman.105 Absent such reform, there are obligations which rest upon the UK courts and 
tribunals to attempt to give effect to the obligations of Member States to comply with EU law, 
understood as ‘supreme’ in the EU’s legal order.106 These obligations rest on the concepts of ‘direct 
effect’ of EU law;107 ‘indirect effect’108 or consistent interpretation; and ‘horizontal effect of general 
principles of EU law’.109  From the point of view of a claimant, these obligations offer decreasing 
levels of protection, given their relative certainty in securing the remedy sought, that is, in practice, 
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the ability of the claimant to enforce an obligation in a measure of EU law, in this case, the 
Framework Directive.  We therefore discuss them in that order.  
 
B Direct effect 
A provision of EU law (including a provision of a Directive)110 which forms a ‘complete legal 
obligation’111 confers upon individuals rights that are enforceable before national courts.112  While 
Treaty provisions may be enforced against private individuals,113 provisions of Directives are 
enforceable only against an ‘emanation of the state’.114  There is no real doubt that Article 2 of the 
Framework Directive, which prohibits discrimination on any of the grounds (including disability) set 
out in Article 1, is a complete legal obligation. The CJEU’s ruling in Marshall v Southampton and 
South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching)115 established that a similar provision, 
Article 5(1) of Directive 76/207 providing for equal treatment as between men and women in the 
workplace,116 was of direct effect. Although there is no decision of the CJEU on the direct effect of 
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Article 2 of the Framework Directive, that is almost certainly because it seems obvious that it meets 
the tests of unconditionality and sufficient precision. If, therefore, it appears to a court or tribunal 
that the implementing legislation (in this case the Equality Act 2010) does not fully implement the 
Framework Directive, a claimant may rely upon the Directive without any recourse to the Act itself, 
provided the respondent is the state or an emanation of the state.117  
Insofar as the definition of disability adopted by the Act now differs and is, we would argue, more 
narrow than the definition applicable under the Directive, the Act does not fully implement the 
Directive. Thus, in a case where a claimant might meet the social model definition of disability but 
not the medical model, the claimant might seek to rely upon his or her rights under EU law as 
against the state. EU law is given legal effect within the UK’s constitution through the European 
Communities Act 1972. Section 2 (1) of the European Communities Act provides that ‘all rights, 
powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions’ created or arising in EU law, which are to be given 
immediate legal effect in national law, ‘shall be recognised and available in law, and be enforced, 
allowed and followed accordingly’. A directly effective provision of EU law (an ‘enforceable 
Community right’ in the words of the European Communities Act) is thus deemed to be part of the 
UK legal system, and is to be treated accordingly by UK courts and tribunals.  The European 
Communities Act imposes a duty on UK courts ‘to override any rule of national law found to be in 
conflict with any directly enforceable rule of Community law’.118  Despite its potential disruption to 
the ordinary relationships between courts and the legislature, as expressed in the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, this duty applies to all courts and tribunals, including at first instance.  
Thus, ‘an industrial tribunal is bound to apply and enforce relevant Community law, and disapply an 
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offending provision of UK domestic legislation to the extent that it is incompatible with Community 
law, in order to give effect to its obligation to safeguard enforceable Community rights’.119  
 
It follows that a claimant seeking redress for non-ideal-weight discrimination, who met only the 
social model of disability, could invite a court or tribunal to ‘disapply’ the Act, at least as to the 
question of whether or not she or he possessed the protected characteristic of disability.120 For 
people with non-ideal-weight who do not meet the medical model definition and who are 
proceeding against a state respondent, the direct effect of the Framework Directive, as interpreted 
by the CJEU, offers a route to claim protection from discrimination. Its key limitation is, however, 
that it gives no redress as against a private respondent.  For that, a claimant would need to rely on 
another route. 
 
B Consistent interpretation/‘indirect effect’ 
Under Article 4 (3) TEU, national courts owe a ‘duty of sincere cooperation’ to the EU, requiring that 
they ‘take any appropriate measure … to ensure fulfilment of the obligations’ in the Treaty or in EU 
legislation.  According to the CJEU, this means that ‘national courts are required to interpret their 
national law in the light of the wording and purpose of [a] Directive, in order to achieve the result 
[intended]’.121  The obligation of consistent or conform interpretation, or ‘indirect effect’, as it is 
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known, applies irrespective of whether the defendant is an emanation of the state.122  It requires 
national courts and tribunals to interpret national law ‘as far as possible’ so as to give effect to EU 
law.123   
The Act must therefore be interpreted as far as possible to conform with the Framework Directive.  
The question of whether a non-ideal-weight claimant, who meets the social (but not the medical) 
model of disability, suffering from discrimination at the hands of a private employer, is protected by 
EU law turns on what is ‘possible’.  In this context, ‘possible’ means consistent with the obligations 
of statutory interpretation, as understood by the national court or tribunal seized of the claim.  In UK 
law, the ordinary ‘canons of construction’ embody judicial deference to Parliament’s will.124  The 
literature125 terms these the literal, golden, purposive126 and mischief rules.127  The starting point, in 
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general, is the literal rule.128  However, the literal rule has been subject to significant scrutiny.  The 
margin of uncertainty at the edges of the core meaning of a word or phrase gives judicial flexibility, 
even if notionally the literal rule is being applied.129  Judges may say that the meaning of words in a 
statute is ‘plain’, but then disagree on their interpretation.130  In the latter part of the twentieth 
century, the literature points to a move away from the literal and towards the purposive 
approach.131  This move is partly attributed to the effect of EU law on UK law.132  At least some UK 
judges have taken the view that the different methods adopted by the CJEU to the interpretation of 
EU law require different methods of interpretation from UK courts when interpreting or applying EU 
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law to those applied to English law.133  In Coleman134 for example, the tribunal was prepared to add 
words to the Act expressly extending protection from direct discrimination to those people 
associated with a person with a disability, where the treatment complained of was because of that 
association. 
Since the Employment Tribunal and the higher courts are required to interpret UK law consistently 
with directives where possible, this route may indirectly pave the way for an accommodation of the 
CJEU’s understanding of disability in national law. Were that to be the case, claims which could only 
succeed relying on a social model definition could be pursued against any respondent. There are, 
however, two potential problems with this route. 
The first is that for disability claims, the obligation is simply to interpret consistently with the 
Framework Directive, which itself is confined to discrimination in the workplace. Commission 
proposals for an extension of the non-discrimination principle for the protected characteristics 
covered by the Framework Directive to the sphere of goods and services have failed to secure the 
necessary support of the other EU legislative institutions.135 The Equality Act 2010 definition of 
disability in Section 6 applies to all the spheres covered by that Act. Conceivably, any route in for the 
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social model would have to be confined to employment cases, creating a significant departure from 
the entire scheme of the Act, which is to establish concepts of general application (the protected 
characteristics and the prohibited conducts) and then to apply them to the different areas of 
coverage.  
The second is the limitation placed upon national courts when exercising their obligations to 
interpret consistently, expressed in the ‘so far as possible’ aspect of the concept of indirect effect. 
The latitude extended to the courts is considerable. From as early as the House of Lords case Litster 
v Forth Dry Dock,136 it has been understood that the courts may imply words in to a statute 
necessary to comply with EU law obligations and that this may entail departure from the strict and 
literal application of the words which the legislature has chosen.137 In the context of disability 
discrimination, the obligation was given effect in the case of Coleman.138 On a reference from a UK 
Employment Tribunal, the CJEU extended the scope of protection from direct discrimination on 
grounds of disability by holding that it includes associative discrimination. Once the matter was 
referred back to the national court, the EAT held that although giving effect to the CJEU’s 
interpretation was an extension of the scope of the legislation as enacted, it was ‘in no sense 
repugnant to it.  On the contrary, it is an extension fully in conformity with the aims of the legislation 
as drafted’.139 The definition of direct discrimination in Section 3A of the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 confined protection to persons with a disability. In order to deal with the incompatibility of 
that restriction with the Directive as now understood, the EAT proposed the addition of an entire 
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new subsection (5A) to section 3A to the effect that ‘a person also discriminates against a person if 
he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat another person by reason of the disability 
of another person’. The matter was later codified by Parliament in the broader definition of direct 
discrimination in the Equality Act. 
Nevertheless, there are limitations upon what the courts may, and indeed are obliged to, do. The 
meaning should ‘go with the grain of the legislation’ and be ‘compatible with the underlying thrust 
of the legislation being construed’.140  An interpretation should not be adopted which is inconsistent 
with a fundamental or cardinal feature of the legislation, since this would cross the boundary 
between interpretation and amendment. The exercise of the interpretative obligation cannot 
require the courts to make a decision for which they are not equipped or give rise to important 
practical repercussions which the court is not equipped to evaluate.141 
One approach to the duty, at least in cases involving non-ideal-weight claimants, would be to turn 
again to the concept of severe disfigurement with a willingness, informed by the CJEU jurisprudence, 
to read that provision as including people who are suffering discrimination because of their weight. 
As we have observed, that would be, in many cases, to strain the natural meaning of the words, 
particularly the term ‘disfigurement’. Nevertheless, it would provide a route for the social model 
definition which did not entail the addition of words into the Act. However this would require 
claimants to identify as disfigured. Many people with non-ideal-weight do not consider themselves 
disabled142 and this further step may prove too difficult for some.143   
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A more satisfactory approach would be to add to the definition in section 6 of the Act by drafting a 
new subsection (2)(A) 
‘A person also has a disability if he possesses a long-term impairment which in interaction 
with any barriers placed by society hinders his full and effective participation in society.’ 
That would of course be to create an additional rather than a replacement definition. We see no 
particular difficulty with that. The reasoning in Kaltoft seems to suggest that satisfaction of a medical 
model definition of disability will suffice to also meet a social model definition. Furthermore, the 
CJEU in Ring specifically referred to its judgment in Chacón Navas in support of part of its 
reasoning144 suggesting that it did not intend the new approach to entail a total abandonment of the 
definition adopted in that case.  Indeed, we have been unable to come up with a hypothetical 
instance where satisfaction of a medical model would not result in satisfaction of a social model. In 
our view, the worst that could be said of this approach to including the social model definition is that 
it would render the first part of the definition in section 6 otiose. In fact, for practical reasons that is 
unlikely to be the case. 
The real difficulty with the social model is that it lacks the legal certainty of the medical model, 
particularly when it comes to evidentiary matters. Indeed, the social model blurs the boundaries 
between the existence or possession of the protected characteristic and the discriminatory 
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consequences. An obvious example is the question of attitudinal barriers. They are a significant issue 
in the case of non-ideal-weight discrimination. In fact, for those people whose non-ideal-weight is 
not sufficient to meet the functional deficit test posed by the medical model, they are the problem. 
The Act’s approach is to first consider whether the claimant can establish the existence of the 
protected characteristic of disability and then to consider whether the discriminatory prohibited 
conduct has taken place. A social model, relying upon attitudinal barriers, posits the existence of a 
protected characteristic established only if and when it can be shown that attitudes, in the form, say, 
of stereotypical thinking, have erected a barrier to full participation, for example a decision not to 
recruit.145 
How would that then play out, for instance, in a complaint of direct discrimination because of 
disability? Under the medical model it would be for the claimant to prove the existence of the 
disability. The claimant would, as a next step, be required to show facts upon which the tribunal or 
court could decide, in the absence of a non- discriminatory explanation, that the Act had been 
contravened. Only if that burden were discharged, would it be for the respondent to provide an 
explanation in no sense connected to the protected characteristic.146 The respondent would be 
entitled to insist that the claimant prove his or her disability before ever adducing any evidence as to 
its actions. Having done so, the claimant would have to adduce a prima facie case that she or he had 
suffered a detriment and that there was a causal connection between the detriment and the fact of 
the protected characteristic. 
Under the social model approach, presumably the claimant would need only to show the existence 
of an impairment and that it was long-term to trigger an examination of the factual matrix of the 
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complaint of discrimination. The burden would rest upon the claimant to show facts which would 
allow the tribunal to decide that discrimination had taken place. Those facts would have to be the 
treatment complained of and the existence of attitudes arising from the impairment which caused 
the treatment and which are the final factor in proving disability.  This has, to the UK legal eye at any 
rate, the smack of circularity. A person is disabled if she or he has been discriminated against 
because they are disabled. 
There is, however, a possible way out of this. If a claimant with non-ideal-weight could show the 
existence of attitudes generally held in society, which have a negative impact upon the ability of 
people of non-ideal-weight to participate in society, perhaps even have had that effect on her or him 
in the past, then that might be thought enough to establish the protected characteristic without 
having to show, at that stage, that the respondent itself harboured those attitudes or acted upon 
them.  That might be left to a second stage of analysis to which the burden of proof provisions could 
apply in a more conventional way. 
 
B Horizontal effect of a general principle of non-discrimination 
There remains a third potential route for a social model definition of disability to establish itself in 
UK law. Over time the CJEU has developed in its jurisprudence the idea that there are certain 
‘general principles’ underpinning all EU law.147 Amongst those is the existence of certain 
fundamental rights as integral to the EU legal order.148 In addition to national constitutional 
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traditions, the CJEU has looked to international human rights treaties, including the UNCRD,149 as a 
source for those fundamental rights.150  A further source is the EU’s own Charter of Fundamental 
Rights 2000, which has ‘the same legal value as the Treaties’.151 
The question of the practical effects of fundamental rights as general principles of EU law in 
litigation involving the enforcement of directives against private parties emerged in the CJEU’s 
judgment in Mangold.152 The complaint was one of direct age discrimination. The conflict between 
the national law, which permitted directly discriminatory treatment of workers on the grounds of 
age in the awarding of fixed term contracts, and the Framework Directive which does not, was 
incapable of being reconciled by indirect effect. The case was between two private individuals and 
thus direct effect in the traditional sense was of no assistance to Mangold. Moreover, the time 
allowed to Member States for the implementation of the Framework Directive had not expired and 
Mangold had therefore no remedy against the (German) state for its failure to transpose the 
Directive into law.153  
The CJEU in Mangold confirmed that non-discrimination is a general principle of EU law.154 However, 
it went significantly further by appearing to create a new approach to the application of EU law in 
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private disputes. At paragraph 76 of its judgment the CJEU, referring to the fact that the time period 
for the implementation of the Framework Directive had yet to expire, said that nevertheless the 
‘observing of the general principle of equal treatment … cannot be conditional upon the expiry of 
the period allowed … in particular so far as the organisation of appropriate legal remedies … to 
implement such a directive are concerned’. In the following paragraph, the CJEU asserted that, in 
such cases, it was for the national court to ensure full effectiveness by setting aside conflicting 
national rules. In other words, this seemed to be an extension of the principle of direct effect to 
cases where the state was not a party.  Chalmers155 describes the CJEU’s judgment as ‘mired in 
obscurity’ and certainly it attracted considerable critical comment.156 Nevertheless, it was followed, 
and to some extent clarified, in another age discrimination case from Germany, Kücüdeveci v 
Swedex.157 Once again, the case concerned a discriminatory national law in conflict with the 
Framework Directive. At paragraphs 50 and 51, the CJEU restated the obligation upon the national 
courts to give effect to the general principle of non-discrimination by disapplying provisions of 
national law which are contrary to that general principle. In so doing, the CJEU stressed the binding 
nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which includes, at Article 20, the right to equality 
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before the law and, at Article 21, a prohibition of discrimination, inter alia on the grounds of age and 
disability.158 
Where does this leave our putative claimant in a non-ideal-weight case brought against a private 
respondent? If that claimant needs to rely upon the social model definition of disability, and the 
court or tribunal considers that the interpretative barriers to ‘indirect effect’ are insuperable, might 
recourse be had to the general principle of non-discrimination, in order to give horizontal direct 
effect to the provisions of the Framework Directive? The reasoning in both Mangold, and with 
greater clarity, in Kücüdeveci is based upon the idea that the Framework Directive is not itself the 
source of the general principle of non-discrimination but is an expression of it. This reasoning 
permits the CJEU to give the Directive what Schiek describes as a ‘heightened degree of 
effectiveness’, which is achieved by a requirement on the national court to exclude national 
legislation which would otherwise be in conflict.159 However, the jurisprudence has not advanced 
since the judgment in Kücüdeveci, despite the opportunity for the CJEU to apply it in an annual leave 
case, Dominguez.160 This missed opportunity leaves doubt as to the full scope of the obligation on 
the national courts apparently required by Mangold and Kücüdeveci.  
One possibility is that it only requires the exclusion of conflicting national legislation, leaving another 
pre-existing and non-discriminatory national rule which can be applied. In Kücüdeveci the national 
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court was able to exclude a national rule limiting the accrual of rights to notice of termination to 
years of service in employment after the worker’s 25th birthday and instead apply the accrual rule 
applicable to workers aged 25 and over. This interpretation is to be contrasted with the substitutory 
requirements of vertical direct effect161 where the national rule is replaced by the relevant Directive 
as the legislation governing the case. If this is the correct reading of Mangold and Kücüdeveci, the 
fundamental rights jurisprudence of the CJEU offers no help to our putative claimant. Excluding the 
section 6 definition of disability leaves a void. There is no alternative definition for our claimant to 
fall back on.  
A further possibility is that the CJEU’s refusal in Dominguez to use the Mangold and Kücüdeveci line 
of reasoning signals an abandonment of it altogether. This prospect has receded somewhat since the 
decision of the CJEU in Association de Mediation Sociale v Union Locale des Syndicats CGT.162 There 
the CJEU refused to give horizontal direct effect to EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 27, 
guaranteeing worker information and consultation, and Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general 
framework for informing and consulting employees,163 Article 3, but did so whilst distinguishing 
Kücüdeveci.164  
For greater clarity of the extent of the general principles approach to direct effect, we must await 
further decisions of the CJEU. At present however, it remains at least a possibility that, where a 
general principle such as non-discrimination is at stake, and national law has failed to give full effect 
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to that principle, even as between private individuals, recourse can be had to the relevant EU 
provisions guaranteeing the principle. Our putative claimant could therefore seek to rely upon the 
general principle of non-discrimination, articulated in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and as 
instrumentalised in the Framework Directive, but understood in the light of the UNCRD, as the 
source of their legal rights. He or she could thus insist upon the social model definition of disability in 
a case against a private individual and evade the restrictive nature of the definition in section 6 of 
the UK Act. Indeed, such a case, if referred, might well prove the material upon which the CJEU could 
further refine its jurisprudence in this area. 
 
A Conclusions 
As the pop song from which we take our title reminds us, people of non-ideal-weight suffer from 
discrimination – in the workplace, and elsewhere.  Meghan Trainor might sing ‘don’t worry about 
your size’, but people do worry about size – and draw negative inferences from those worries.  Does 
UK law offer any protection from the effects of that discrimination?  The relevant domestic 
legislation, the Equality Act 2010, is limited in its scope as it embodies a medical model to define 
disability.  For that reason, the Act is able to extend protection only to the limited number of people 
whose weight is such that it causes them functional deficit. The existence of protection against 
discrimination because of perceived disability does not, in our view, add any significant extension to 
the coverage by the Act, because it requires that a person be perceived as disabled as defined by the 
Act. Although we have considered the possibility of persons with non-ideal-weight bringing 
themselves within the definition by relying on the concept of ‘severe disfigurement’, we have, on 
balance, concluded that it is unlikely that UK courts and tribunals would construe the term ‘severe 
disfigurement’ as extending to persons of non-ideal-weight, except perhaps in the cases of extreme 
emaciation or obesity, which would in any case meet the medical model’s definition. 
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The Act offers very limited protection. What about the application of EU law? The standard 
understanding of the relationship between EU and UK law is that UK courts and tribunals are obliged 
to give effect to ‘supreme’ EU law. The UNCRD has influenced EU law’s understanding of what is 
meant by disability. The UNCRD’s social model of disability offers broader protection than the 
medical model.  In theory, therefore, EU law provides a route for people of non-ideal-weight to 
challenge discrimination based on their weight, relying upon a social model. Nonetheless, we 
conclude that, on balance, save for claims against a state employer, the possibility of introducing a 
social model definition of disability into UK law remains highly problematic. The constraints upon UK 
courts in their interpretative duties and the uncertain state of the jurisprudence on the horizontal 
direct effect of the general principle of non-discrimination preclude an effective remedy in practical 
terms. Our conclusion overall therefore is that it is difficult to discern a clear and robust legal 
protection in the UK from discrimination for most people of non-ideal-weight. 
Our analysis suggests that the paradigm example of non-ideal-weight discrimination offers an ideal 
opportunity for the CJEU to develop and clarify its perhaps tantalising jurisprudence on horizontal 
direct effect of general principles of EU law. Because a medical model has been relied upon as a 
basis for the definition of disability, the UK’s Equality Act 2010 stands in conflict with the general 
principle of non-discrimination on the ground of disability.  Faced with a preliminary reference 
where, on the facts, a person with non-ideal-weight could only hope to be regarded as disabled by 
relying upon a social model definition, and where the respondent was a private body, the CJEU 
would be obliged to choose whether to continue along the path begun by the judgments in Mangold 
and Kücüdeveci or to retreat and reassert the pre-Mangold orthodoxy.  Were the CJEU to pursue the 
idea of a horizontal direct effect in cases where a general principle of EU law was at stake, it might 
clarify whether that effect was of an exclusory or substitutory nature, a matter which is critical to 
the success of claims under this mechanism for rendering effective obligations and entitlements 
enshrined in EU law.  
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More broadly, our research agenda offers insight into the practical barriers to enforcing entitlements 
to non-discrimination before UK courts. We have described the potential disruption caused by a 
definition of disability confined to workplace discrimination when the Equality Act 2010 seeks to 
extend a single definition to discrimination cases arising in several spheres.  Of even greater 
importance, we have identified a very significant difficulty, should a social model definition gain 
traction in UK law, whether by the application of EU law or because of marginal legislative reform. 
The entire structure and rationale of UK legislative protection against discrimination is based upon a 
separation of the concept of ‘protected characteristic’ from the concept of ‘prohibited conduct’. 
Certain ‘key concepts’165 apply throughout the Act. These include ‘protected characteristics’166 and 
‘prohibited conduct’.167 In some cases, the protection of the Act is extended only to those in 
possession of a protected characteristic; in others conduct is prohibited on the basis of association 
with a person with the characteristic, or on the basis of perception that a person may have the 
characteristic. In all cases, however, the prohibited conduct only becomes prohibited if it is, in some 
sense, connected to a protected characteristic.  The court must investigate whether the threshold 
test of protected characteristic is satisfied, before it turns its attention to the question of whether 
prohibited conduct has taken place. Courts and tribunals must consider whether the one has caused 
the other.  
The structure seeks to balance the interests of claimants and those of respondents, and to promote 
legal certainty, transparency and fairness.  The separation of concepts is so intrinsic to the statutory 
approach that, for instance, case law insists that direct discrimination cannot be found where it is 
shown that the alleged discriminator was ignorant of the existence of the protected characteristic, 
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which is particularly relevant in the instance of disability.168 A social model definition would force 
courts and tribunals to investigate the existence of an attitudinal barrier as part of their 
consideration of whether the claimant met the threshold test of disability. A person relying upon the 
social model is likely to wish to establish that they meet the definition of disability by virtue of 
attitudinal barriers prevalent in society. Indeed, the social model definition derives much of its 
power from that idea. A claimant seeking to establish the existence of those barriers will wish a 
court or tribunal to take into account, as evidence of their existence, any adverse conduct towards 
the claimant on the part of the discriminator.  This approach would create unfairness for the 
respondent, who would be obliged to engage in a forensic exercise, potentially involving a great deal 
of evidence and considerable expense, in seeking to disprove the existence of the claimed attitudinal 
barriers. Not to do so would be to run the risk of the claimant adducing unchallenged evidence 
which would not only point towards the existence of the disability, but also go a very long way 
towards proving the discriminatory conduct linked to it.  
We describe this elision of two separate stages in the evidentiary process as creating a circularity 
that is highly unlikely to have been intended by Parliament. A person is disabled if they have been 
adversely treated because they are disabled.  The only way of breaking out of that circularity is for 
the court or tribunal to locate the attitudinal barriers not with that particular respondent, but more 
generally in society.  A claimant would have to prove not just the existence of the impairment of 
non-ideal-weight but also the existence of attitudinal barriers in society by reference to which that 
impairment was disabling.  Such an approach would be fairer to the respondent, as the onus of 
proving both elements would remain on the claimant, which is what the Act intends.  Courts and 
tribunals might accept as such evidence the literature on bias against people of non-ideal-weight, 
cited in our introduction. The alternative would be for legislation to add non-ideal-weight to the 
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category of deemed disabilities, recognising the existence and effect of those barriers, in the same 
way as severe disfigurement has been treated.  
The theoretical but nonetheless plausible scenario of a person of non-ideal-weight seeking to 
enforce an entitlement not to be discriminated against a private employer, which we have 
investigated in this article, illustrates deficiencies in the ‘standard accounts’ of how EU law is 
supposed to apply in national contexts.  Such accounts imagine a ‘supreme’ EU law, perhaps inspired 
by ‘general principles’, or ‘fundamental human rights’, including those enshrined in international 
conventions and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  The ‘new legal order’169 of EU law is 
supposed to grant rights to individuals within Member States, and impose obligations upon both the 
state and private individuals.  But as the example discussed in this article shows, to reach a position 
of offering protection of such rights to individual claimants, national judges are required to go 
through a complex series of legal evolutions, which take them beyond standard understandings of 
their constitutional position. They must interpret the obligations that are found in the European 
Communities Act 1972 which require consistent interpretation of UK statutory language with EU law. 
That EU law is expressed in the CJEU’s sometimes surprising declaratory interpretations of EU 
statutory texts, which themselves have been found by the CJEU to express international obligations 
articulated in extremely general terms. National courts must do so alongside obligations of 
deference to Parliament, embodied in the ordinary canons of statutory interpretation. Even though 
they may of course make a preliminary reference to the CJEU,170 national constitutional courts may 
experience some discomfort in navigating these potentially competing claims of judicial fidelity to 
the language of national and EU legislation.  But in the case of disability discrimination in the UK, first 
instance tribunals are expected to do so.   
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It seems to us that the UK cannot avoid at least a version of the social model for much longer. The 
Framework Directive must be read as requiring Member States to define disability not only through 
a medical model, but also through a social model.  To that extent, the Equality Act 2010 stands in 
conflict with the Directive.  However, the difficulties for courts and tribunals in finding an 
appropriate route for the introduction of the Directive into the national legislative framework and 
the consequences for the litigation of cases should they do so are such that, in our view, compliance 
with EU law cannot be achieved without further legislation.171 
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